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TAMING RULE 10b-5-1: THE UNFINISHED
BUSINESS OF TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
Daniel J. Morrissey*
ABSTRACT
Insider trading has shaped both the evolution of the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the current state of securities law. The injustice of
insider trading, especially as felt by everyday shareholders and investors,
mandated action by government regulators. Consequently, the SEC en-
acted Rule 10b-5—a prohibition and prosecution on any corporate offi-
cials’ use of material, non-public information for private profit. In SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., Rule 10b-5 grew into the sanction on insider trad-
ing that it is known as today. As case law whet Rule 10b-5’s reach on in-
sider trading, corporate executives became increasingly concerned that
necessary business transactions would be considered fraud. Thus, the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5-1. Through this safe harbor, corporate officials
could again purchase or sell shares in the companies they ran. Although
the safe harbor is subject to certain limitations, abuse of Rule 10b-5-1 has
become increasingly apparent. This article seeks to critically analyze the
shortcomings of Rule 10b-5-1 and investigate potential courses of action
that could remediate its insufficiencies.
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I. WHEN EXECUTIVES CONCEAL MATERIAL
INFORMATION IN THEIR PURCHASES AND SALES
INSIDER trading is one of the perennially fascinating topics in securi-ties law.1 Corporate officials who profit from privileged informationdo something inherently wrong—much like someone who cheats at
poker by finding out the cards held by the other players. In addition, it is
not as if these illicit gains can be justified as some form of occult compen-
sation for underpaid officers and directors. In recent years, their remu-
neration has been lush.2
Such fraud naturally arouses the indignation of ordinary shareholders
who sense the injustice of their executives benefitting from non-public
facts that are likely to determine the movement of their shares. Informa-
tion drives stock prices, and while there is nothing wrong with predicting
future valuations by insightfully assessing publicly available data, all in-
vestors must be on a level playing field. As the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”)3 put it: “[T]he fundamental un-
fairness of insider trading harms not only individual investors, but also
the very foundations of our markets, by undermining investor confidence
in [their] integrity.”4
The law once seemed to condone that wrongdoing—apparently in a
belief that such clandestine gains were just another form of compensation
for corporate management. As ethical awareness grew, however, some
courts began granting relief against those who abused their knowledge of
“special facts.”5 The federal securities laws passed in the 1930s were spe-
cifically designed to protect investors from such fraud.
II. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE
One of them, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),6
contains several provisions targeting insider trading. It requires that cer-
tain corporate officials and large shareholders disclose the shares they
hold in their companies,7 and gives stockholders the right to recover any
“short swing” profits made trading them.8 Another section of the statute
1. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 504 (7th ed.
2017).
2. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensation and Income Inequality, 4 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013).
3. The SEC is the independent federal regulatory agency charged with administering
and enforcing the federal securities laws. For a full description of the Commission and its
mission, see Office of the Investor Advocate, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/page/investor-advo-
cate-landing-page [https://perma.cc/2WPY-FV4K] (last modified Feb. 8, 2017).
4. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881
(Aug. 15, 2000), 2000 WL 1201556, at *20.
5. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E.
659, 660 (Mass. 1933).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2012).
7. See Exchange Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012).
8. See § 78p(b).
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grants broad power to the SEC to make rules prohibiting fraudulent prac-
tices in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.9
Acting on that mandate, in the early 1940s the Commission promul-
gated the most far-reaching of those provisions, Rule 10b-5.10 By the
early 1960s, it was using Rule 10b-5 to sanction corporate officials who
purchased stock from their investors without telling them important in-
formation.11 Just a few years later, that legal approach became well estab-
lished in the foundational case celebrated in this symposium, SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.12 In that case, an influential appellate court up-
held injunctions against a company, a number of its officers, and directors
who had downplayed mineral findings on their firm’s properties while at
the same time buying more stock themselves and tipping off others to do
the same.
In the ensuing decades, while the Commission was vigorously prosecut-
ing such wrongdoing,13 rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court refined the
reach of Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on insider trading. To be liable, pur-
chasers or sellers of securities had to have a fiduciary duty to the individ-
uals with whom they traded.14
Those who were told non-public information by an insider could be
liable as well, but only if their tipper received an improper benefit in ex-
change for the information.15 Just recently the Supreme Court reaffirmed
this approach when it sustained the conviction of a tippee who bought
shares using confidential news he received from a family member.16 In
addition, the Supreme Court held in United States v. O’Hagan that indi-
viduals could violate Rule 10b-5 if they used information they misappro-
priated, even if they had no relationship with their trading
counterparties.17
III. RULE 10B5-1
Yet even as the law on insider trading became clearer, executives who
wanted to purchase or sell shares in their companies remained concerned.
Often, they know significant matters about their firms that are not availa-
ble to the public. The Commission addressed those apprehensions by
promulgating a new rule, Rule 10b5-1, which was designed to give corpo-
9. See Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
10. Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
11. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668 (Nov. 8, 1961),
1961 WL 60638, at *1–3.
12. See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
13. One SEC chair in the early 1980s famously said the Commission would “come
down on insider trading with ‘hobnail boots.’” David A. Vise, Former SEC Chief John
Shad Dies, WASH. POST (July 9, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1994/
07/09/former-sec-chief-john-shad-dies/9170b707-f685-4282-822e-35329acbdecf/?utm_term
=.64ce6db9363c [https://perma.cc/AHW3-XMVB].
14. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
15. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
16. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016).
17. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649–50 (1997).
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rate officials a more detailed procedure for liquidating holdings in their
own companies without their sales being fraudulent. As a prelude to the
new rule, however, the SEC first clarified its own position on what would
constitute trading “on the basis”18 of material, non-public information.
Because of language in the O’Hagan opinion, many questioned
whether just buying or selling shares while in possession of material non-
public information could be tantamount to its illegal usage.19 The Com-
mission’s response was in essence “yes.” If executives were “aware” of
material, non-public information and trading, the SEC said the common
sense understanding would be that they were inevitably making use of
it.20 As one court succinctly put it, “material information can not lay idle
in the human brain.”21
After stating that, however, the Commission went on to promulgate
Rule 10b5-1 as an affirmative defense to charges of such illegal action.
Using it, large shareholders and corporate officials could set up plans in
advance for purchases or sales of their shares if they established them
when they were not in possession of material, non-public information.22
These programs would then be available as a safe harbor to charges of
insider trading, even if executives made purchases or sales of their shares
when they knew of privileged information that might otherwise subject
them to liability.23
Under the rule, such a plan for trading would have to provide written
instructions to a broker that would have three aspects. First, it must spec-
ify the amount, price (which may include a limit price),24 and particular
dates for the purchases or sales.25 While the rule does not mandate that
an executive wait any length of time before beginning to trade after initi-
ating a plan, many companies require a time length (typically a month)26
as a matter of risk management.27
Second, the program would include a formula or similar method for
determining the amount, price, and date of those trades.28 Under those
18. Id. at 653, 656.
19. See Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t Ask,
Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 154–60
(1998).
20. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 4, at *21.
21. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120–21 (2d. Cir. 1993).
22. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 4, at *19–20.
23. See Stuart Gelfond & Arielle L. Katzman, Insider Trading, Proactive Planning: A
Guide to Rule 10b-5-1 Plans, 29 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR NO. 11, November
2015, at 1, 4.
24. This is “an order to buy or sell stock at a specific price or better.” Limit Orders,
SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerslimithtm.html [https://perma.cc/F4J5-GUJ3]
(last modified Mar. 10, 2011).
25. See Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(1) (2017).
26. Gelfond, supra note 23, at 5.
27. See Michael Kaplan, Rule 10b5-1 Plans: What You Need to Know, DAVIS POLK
(Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.davispolk.com/files/files/Publication/c0b412f9-d08e-4abf-a327-
3f215728160e/Preview/PublicationAttachment/5dbd1bac-15b1-4b37-ae75-4388773478c4/
011813_10b-5_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX9M-4DLS].
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(2) (2017).
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conditions, the executive’s broker would have no discretion in making
purchases or sales. Under the third feature, however, brokers could have
such discretion so long as they also have the exclusive right to determine
how and when to make the trades and are unaware of any material non-
public information when doing so.29
At first examination, then, the rule seemed to have the virtue of
preventing self-dealing conflicts in much the same way as a traditional
blind trust. In such situations, those holding public office give over the
management of their investments to an independent party and know
nothing of how that individual will administer them.30 Similarly, a Rule
10b5-1 pre-ordained plan offers a safe harbor from insider trading liabil-
ity even if transactions made under it occur when corporate officials are
aware of non-public material information.31 Given the legitimate reasons
that corporate officials may have to raise funds by selling their stock, such
a program can be of great benefit to them. As one commentator put it, “a
well-thought-out and implemented 10b5-1 plan may help a company and
its executives avoid or ultimately refute accusations of impropriety.”32
IV. FLAWS IN THE SAFEGUARD
However, the rule hardly provides an airtight guarantee that company
officials will not be able to profit unfairly from insider transactions. For
example, 10b5-1 plans do not have to be publicly disclosed, and as a re-
sult, regulators or other shareholders cannot verify that those who set
them up are adhering to them.33 Thus, there is no outside check on
whether corporate officials are establishing their plans, as they are sup-
posed to, without information about future stock movements in mind.
In addition, there is nothing to stop executives from modifying or can-
celling existing plans and not disclosing such changes. They can therefore
move in and out of these programs—ending one or setting up another—
while in possession of private information. For that matter, corporate
managers may even have multiple plans in effect at the same time. In that
case, any one of them can provide an affirmative defense to illegal
trading.34
Even assuming these plans are set up when corporate officials are una-
ware of significant inside information, they can still game the rule by pub-
licly disclosing such facts or holding them back in ways that will maximize
their trading profits.35 For instance, CEOs who know of negative news
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) (2017).
30. For a good critical piece on those, however, see Megan J. Ballard, The Shortsight-
edness of Blind Trusts, 56 KAN. L. REV. 43 (2007).
31. See Gelfond, supra note 23, at 4.
32. Kaplan, supra note 27, at 1.
33. See Taylan Mavruk & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do SEC’s 10b5-1 Safe Harbor Rules Need
to be Rewritten?, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 133, 135–36 (2016).
34. See Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55 MGMT.
SCI. 224, 226–27 (2009).
35. See id. at 226.
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can delay its release until after sales under their plans occur. Conversely,
they might speed up disclosure of news likely to favorably impact the
price of their stock so that it would hit the market before one of their
planned sales happens. In addition, since corporations themselves can
adopt 10b5-1 programs, a company might delay the release of good news
so it could repurchase its own shares more cheaply.36
V. CRITICAL STUDIES AND REPORTS
Even though the reason for Rule 10b5-1 is to prevent insiders from
capitalizing on private information, it is not surprising that many still
seem to be doing just that. A study published several years after the rule
was promulgated indicated that corporate officials who had adopted such
plans were experiencing abnormal returns on their trades.37
Insider sales, it discovered, were above average preceding the publica-
tion of news about negative firm performance, and their purchases were
likewise abnormally high after price dips that followed it. Sales by com-
pany officials were thus suspiciously occurring right before a stock drop,
and their purchases were happening immediately before a price rise. The
study also found that 46% of the plans involving preordained sales were
terminated in advance of positive news so that officials could keep their
shares and enjoy the gains resulting from the release of that informa-
tion.38 Despite the alarming implications of that study, it did not lead to
an increase in insider trading prosecutions.39
A later investigation that also reviewed trading patterns by individuals
with Rule 10b5-1 plans concluded that such abnormal profits occur even
after corporate officials reveal that they have adopted them. Insiders, it
found, then begin strategically engaging in purchases and sales using their
programs as cover against charges of illegal activity.40 The study called
this tactic “hiding in plain sight”41 because Rule 10b-5-1 plans seemed to
be immunizing corporate officials from insider trading charges even
though they were engaging in that very activity.42
Following that, several detailed pieces in the Wall Street Journal re-
ported particular instances of such misconduct occurring. They pointed to
36. Allan Horwich, The Legality of Opportunistically Timing Public Company Disclo-
sures in the Context of SEC Rule 10b5-1, 71 BUS. LAW. 1113, 1119–20 (2016).
37. See Jagolinzer, supra note 34, at 232–33.
38. See id. at 235.
39. See Kaplan, supra note 27, at 1.
40. See M. Todd Henderson, Alan Jagolinzer & Karl Muller, Hiding in Plain Sight:
Can Disclosure Enhance Insiders’ Trade Returns? 2–3, (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Se-
ries in Law & Econ. No. 411, 2012).
41. Id. at 2.
42. Companies and their officials could do that by heading off securities fraud suits or
making them more likely to be dismissed at the pleading stage. Their plans would provide
prima facie evidence against such wrongdoing before any discovery could dig deeper into
what was really going on. Prosecution of insider trading cases could also be made more
difficult because the test for wrongful use of information would likely be applied when
defendants started their plans, not at the time they executed their trades. See Jagolinzer,
supra note 34, at 226–27.
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a number of top corporate officials with those plans and described how
they were using them to make very beneficial trades before news became
public that moved the price of their shares.43 Many of these trades in-
volved sales made shortly before the release of unfavorable news, which
allowed the officials to get out of the market ahead of a substantial price
drop.44 Some of them were even more suspicious because the executives
made trades under new plans that they apparently established just to al-
low those sales.
VI. POTENTIAL AMENDMENTS TO RULE 10B5-1
These concerns have given rise to a number of proposals to reform
10b5-1 to prevent such abuses. The first proposal came from the SEC
itself just two years after it promulgated the rule. It would have required
a company whose officials adopted one of those arrangements to report
the plan publicly “to provide investors with prompt disclosure of this in-
formation.”45 As the Commission cogently put it, “[a] director’s or execu-
tive officer’s termination or modification of a Rule 10b5-1 [plan] may
indicate a change regarding the company’s prospects, and thus may be
valuable information to investors.”46 After setting forth that proposed
amendment to the rule, however, the Commission took no steps to imple-
ment it and gave no reason for its inaction.47
Recently, Professors Taylan Mavruk and H. Nejat Seyhun have made
more ambitious suggestions to reform Rule 10b5-1.48 As background,
they surveyed over 1,500,000 transactions between 2003 and 2013 made
by more than 14,000 insiders.49 The professors found no statistical differ-
ence between 10b5-1 and non-10b5-1 transactions. In both situations,
“positive abnormal returns follow their purchases and negative abnormal
returns follow their sales” indicating that in both instances the transac-
tions were motivated by “material non-public information.”50 The au-
thors thus concluded their findings with this blunt assessment: “insiders
exploit their material non-public information using both 10b5-1 planned
43. See Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Executives’ Good Luck in Trading Own Stock,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2012, 11:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444
100404577641463717344178.
44. See Susan Pulliam, Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Insider-Trading Probe Widens,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2012, 8:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873
23339704578171703191880378.
45. Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions, Exchange Act Release
No. 33-8090 (Apr. 12, 2002), 2002 WL 538909, at *1. The company’s disclosure would have
to name the official, give the date she entered into plan and state its duration. It would also
have to describe the trading program itself and name the broker who would execute its
orders. In addition, the company would have to report any transaction executed under the
plan and describe in general terms any alteration of it.
46. Id. at *14.
47. See Allan Horwich, The Legality of Opportunistically Timing Public Company Dis-
closures in the Context of SEC Rule 10b5-1, 71 BUS. LAW. 1113, 1134 (2016).
48. See Mavruk, supra note 33, at 134–37.
49. Id. at 146–47.
50. Id. at 160, 164.
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and non-planned transactions.”51 In addition, the professors put forth ex-
amples to show how two aspects of Rule 10b5-1 trading allows such abu-
sive conduct. It permits executives to set up programs to trade their
shares under a formula or algorithm, but at the same time, they can also
condition those purchases or sales on the market price of their stock.
If, for instance, insiders know from privileged sources that their shares
are not likely to fall below their current price but will be overvalued when
they rise to a certain level, their plans can provide for sales at that high
point. Conversely, if executives have private knowledge about a stock
drop that might be permanent, they can set sale orders for when their
shares go below a certain level.52 Citing those illustrations, the professors
conclude that Rule 10b5-1 gives insiders “wide latitude to fully incorpo-
rate their material non-public information right into the safe harbor
plan’s trading formula.”53
After laying out the reasons why Rule 10b5-1 is “quite problematic,”54
Marvuk and Seyhun then offer their own proposal for reforming it. First,
a plan’s initial trades “must be scheduled no less than six months after the
plan is filed” and any amendments to the plan would have to reset that
timetable.55 Second, they propose that the SEC substantially limit the
rule’s reach. The Commission should “repeal its permission regarding
[the use of] prices, formulas, and computer programs and insist that . . .
trading decisions [under the safe harbor] cannot be conditioned on future
stock price or market conditions.”56
The parameters of 10b5-1 plans would thus be greatly restricted. As the
professors proposed in their scaled-down version of the rule, “[i]nstead,
insiders must simply submit the number of shares to be purchased or sold
and the dates for those proposed transactions.”57 Third, companies must
publicly disclose the details of these plans. In that way, “both the SEC
and investors can verify that the executives are actually complying with
their own proposed rules.”58
In the same vein, the Council of Institutional Investors (“the Council”)
just recently renewed the request to reform the rule that it had made
several times earlier to the Commission. Its goal was to stop what it called
a “long running abuse of the spirit of [Rule 10b5-1].”59 To forestall such
flagrant wrongdoing, the Council proposed what it called “protocols and
51. Id. at 164.
52. See id. at 138–39.
53. Id. at 139.
54. Id. at 138.
55. See id. at 136.
56. Id. at 137.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Letter from the Council of Institutional Investors to the Hon. Jay Clayton, Chair-
man, SEC, (Jan. 18, 2018) (on file with author). As an egregious example of conduct that
the rule apparently condones, the Council cited a $39 million sale of Intel stock in Novem-
ber 2017 by the company’s CEO. He made that within 30 days of revising his trading plan
for the second time that year and just weeks before the announcement of a design flaw in
Intel’s chips. Id.
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guidelines” that all Rule 10b5-1 plans should have.60
The first of those would lessen the ability of executives to have private
information when they adopt their plans by only allowing insiders to
make them during company sanctioned trading windows—typically the
interval after the announcement of a firm’s quarterly financial results and
before the close of the next one.61 Then, to prevent the use of non-public
information once corporate officials have adopted such a plan, a
mandatory waiting period, preferably three months, should apply before
they can take action under it.62
Similarly, wrote the Council, the rule should not allow insiders to make
multiple overlapping plans or to frequently modify or cancel them.63
Companies and their officials should also be required to disclose their
programs and any transactions made under them, along with any amend-
ments to them and their terminations.64 Lastly, boards of companies that
allow these plans should adopt policies governing them and monitor their
usage.65 Directors should also make sure that those protocols include dis-
cussions of their firm’s guidelines or requirements on equity hedging,
holding, and ownership.66
VII. PESSIMISM ABOUT REFORMS
These well thought-out suggestions give ample specifics on how the
SEC might tighten up the rule so that corporate officials cannot use it as a
protection for the wrongful conduct that commentators and business
journalists have identified. Yet, given the Commission’s history of inac-
tion on such proposals (one that the SEC itself made, and others submit-
ted several times by groups like the Council of Institutional Investors), it
is unlikely that any such reforms will be forthcoming, even though the
Commission’s mission is to safeguard investors from just such fraud. In
apparent frustration, one financial reporter has even gone so far as to
urge that the rule be repealed outright because investors would be better
off without the false assurance it gives that insiders are making their
purchases and sales innocently.67
On top of that, a well-considered piece by Professor Allan Horwich
that reviews this distressing situation comes to the negative conclusion
that there is very little that can be done about the issue under existing








67. Stephen Gandel, SEC Needs to Quit Taking Executives’ Word on Stock Sales: Pre-
arranged 10b-5-1 Plans Push the Envelope on Insider Trading, BLOOMBERG GADFLY (Jan.
9, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2018-01-09/sec-needs-to-
quit-taking-executives-word-on-stock-sales [https://perma.cc/8AX8-WCGV].
68. See Horwich, supra note 47, at 1150.
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ket timing to achieve abnormal returns in their Rule 10b5-1 trades.69 He
also acknowledges that those preordained programs even allow for the
use of non-public information to game the prohibitions against such
fraudulent purchases and sales.
Yet, Horwich says that, absent amending the Rule, such actions are
permissible because the federal securities laws only mandate disclosure of
information in certain specific situations, and that timing disclosure to
coincide favorably with planned trades is not one of them. Therefore, ac-
cording to Professor Horwich, Rule 10b5-1 as it is currently stated does
not cover such illegal activity, nor can the SEC change it to make it do so,
because the Commission’s anti-fraud rule-making is constrained by its en-
abling statute—§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act—as construed by the Su-
preme Court.70
The professor supports that largely by focusing on the Court’s opinion
in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green that limited the reach of Rule 10b-
5.71 The plaintiff in that case claimed that the defendant corporation that
was buying his shares in a short form merger was fraudulently paying
inadequate consideration for them. The Supreme Court however focused
on the specific language of § 10(b)72 and held that any regulations
promulgated under it, such as Rule 10b-5, had to involve conduct that
was “manipulative or deceptive.”73
Horwich rules out the first of those terms from applying to abuses of
10b5-1 even though he concedes, “[market timing 10b5-1 plans] might be
characterized colloquially as manipulation of the corporate disclosure
process.”74 Instead, he cites this language in Santa Fe which defines the
term narrowly: “[m]anipulation . . . when used in connection with securi-
ties markets . . . refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched
orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artifi-
cially affecting market activity.”75
While Horwich does allow that “deception,” by contrast, generally in-
volves a materially misleading statement or omission, he asserts that its
reach does not cover market timing, because silence alone absent a duty
to speak does not constitute deception. However, he acknowledges that
there are situations where one has an obligation to make disclosure of
known material facts, such as when SEC regulations mandate it or where
one must do so to correct a “half-truth.”76 Yet, a scheme to profit by Rule
10b-5-1 market timing is not such a situation, he says.
Horwich does, however, recognize one interesting caveat to his claim
69. See id. at 1136–37.
70. See id. at 1124–27.
71. See id. (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)).
72. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
73. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473–74.
74. Horwich, supra note 47, at 1124.
75. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476.
76. See Horwich, supra note 47, at 1124–27.
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that such activity is not securities fraud.77 The rule itself provides that its
affirmative defense is only available if a Rule 10b5-1 program is “entered
into in good faith and not as part of a plan or scheme to evade the
prohibitions of this section.”78 As such, someone, who at its inception
contemplates using such a program to gain an unfair trading advantage,
would then not have initiated it in good faith. The safe harbor would
therefore not apply, and transactions made while aware of private infor-
mation would constitute unlawful insider trading.
After generally ruling out federal law from prohibiting such market
timing activity, however, Horwich recognizes that the corporate law of a
number of states may forbid it. Such activity may well be a breach of the
duty of loyalty that officers and directors owe to their shareholders not to
make secret profits in their dealing with them. He cites a decision from
Delaware, Brophy v. Cities Service Co.,79 for that conclusion and points
to recent examples of cases involving spring-loading and bullet-dodging,80
where shareholders also successfully asserted such claims under state law
against corporate management.81
VIII. SHAREHOLDERS DO HAVE WAYS TO REDRESS THIS
WRONGDOING
Even though state officials and the SEC may be unlikely to pursue such
claims,82 shareholders who feel victimized by this wrongdoing may well
pursue civil actions (i.e., derivative suits)83 to remedy it and vindicate the
integrity of our trading markets.
First, suspicious purchases or sales such as those identified here may
indicate, as Professor Horwich acknowledges, that such Rule 10b5-1 plans
were made in bad faith and therefore never effective. Information about
that can come directly from sources like whistleblowers or indirectly from
strong circumstantial evidence. For instance, statistics about questionable
trading plans led courts to sustain claims for illegal activity in numerous
options backdating cases.84 Second, aggrieved shareholders can also bring
77. See id.
78. Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(ii).
79. See Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. 1949); see also Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
80. In “spring-loading,” companies award options to their executives before they re-
lease good news that sends their stock price higher. In “bullet-dodging,” companies issue
them right after the release of bad news, making their exercise price correspondingly
lower. See Horwich, supra note 47, at 1141–44.
81. Id. at 1141–47.
82. There have apparently only been two enforcement actions by the SEC involving
Rule 10b5-1 wrongdoing. See id. at 1119.
83. The author has written extensively about this as the ideal mechanism to remedy
corporate corruption. See generally Daniel J. Morrissey, Shareholder Litigation After the
Meltdown, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 531 (2012); Daniel J. Morrissey, The Path of Corporate
Law: Of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and the Business Judgment Rule, 86 OR. L.
REV. 973 (2007); Daniel J. Morrissey, New Rulings Threaten the Derivative Suit—Will the
“Needed Policeman” Keep Walking the Beat?, 36 S.C. L. REV. 631 (1985).
84. Executives engaged in that wrongful conduct by selecting times before those op-
tions were issued when the underlying shares were trading for a much lower price. They
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state actions against wrongdoing corporate officials for breaches of their
duty of loyalty.85 Defendants in such actions will not be able to claim the
protection of Rule 10b5-1’s safe harbor because that affirmative defense
is only available against charges of federal insider fraud—not breaches of
the fiduciary duties that corporate officials owe to their companies.
Third, even though Santa Fe v. Green can be read as providing a nar-
row definition of “manipulative” activity, as Professor Horwich concedes,
the plain meaning of that term can cover market timing activity.86 And
one may even more readily find Rule 10b-5 “deception” in that activity
when an insider conceals his market timing plans. As expert commenta-
tors have noted, the federal securities laws find that as wrongful activity
when one has a duty to speak,87 and such an obligation certainly exists
when corporate officials keep silent about material, non-public informa-
tion while purchasing shares from their stockholders.88 How is market
time activity in Rule 10b5-1 trades any different from that? The execu-
tives there are not disclosing a key fact that their counterparties in the
transaction would want to know, i.e. their scheme to defraud them by
making their purchases or sales coincide with news that will favorably
affect the price of their shares.
IX. CONCLUSION
There is much evidence that the Rule 10b5-1 safe harbor is being
abused by a number of corporate officials and may even be used to cover
illegal insider trades. As discussed in this article, inaction by government
regulators should not inhibit frustrated shareholders from initiating their
own legal actions to remedy this wrongdoing. In doing that important
work, they will be safeguarding the integrity of our securities markets and
preserving the legacy of Texas Gulf Sulphur.
would then secretly change their grant dates to make it appear that those rights were
awarded at that earlier time—making it possible for those corporate officials to fraudu-
lently enhance their gain when they exercised them. See, e.g., In re F5 Networks, Inc., 207
P.3d 433, 435 (Wash. 2009); see also Daniel J. Morrissey, The Path of Corporate Law: Of
Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and the Business Judgment Rule, 86 Or. L. Rev. 973,
982–87 (2007).
85. See Horwich, supra note 47, at 1148–50.
86. See Horwich, supra note 47, at 1124–27.
87. For a good discussion on when failure to disclose material facts constitutes securi-
ties fraud, see MARC I. STEINBERG, WENDY G. COUTURE, MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, &
DANIEL J. MORRISSEY, SECURITIES LITIGATION 193–95 (2016).
88. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1980) (noting silence is fraud-
ulent upon a showing of “a duty to disclose” which “arises from a specific relationship
between two parties,” such as the relationship of “agent, . . . fiduciary, . . . [or] a person in
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence.”).
